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Sterlization, Retardation, and Parental Authority
Sterilization is a multifaceted, extremely complex topic
embracing a variety of issues and concerns ranging from morality
and propriety to constitutionality. Very few, if any, of the issues
surrounding the sterilization controversy can be said to be matters of settled doctrine. This Comment will explore in detail only
one aspect of the controvery-the power of a parent to consent to
the sexual sterilization1of his mentally retarded2 minor child absent any specific statutory authorization to do so.
Sterilization of mentally retarded minors upon the request
and consent of their parents involves many basic interests and
values. Parental discretion in directing the upbringing and care
of children is one such value. A sometimes contrasting interest is
the basic right of every person to choose for himself whether or
not he will bear or beget children, absent compelling considerations which dictate that this right should be limited. In pursuit
of a resolution of the potential conflicts between parent and child
in this area, this Comment will first briefly survey the current law
and attitudes concerning sterilization and then examine the common law parent-child relationship in an attempt to discover
whether or not that relationship endows a parent with the authority to have his retarded child sterilized. This inquiry will lead to
a discussion of the policy considerations relevant to determining
whether a parent should have this authority. Finally, recommen--

1. "Sterilization," as it is used throughout this Comment, refers to any of a number
of surgical procedures by means of which a male or female is rendered permanently
incapable of bearing or begetting children. The more common sexual sterilization procedures are vasectomy for the male and hysterectomy and tuba1 ligation for the female. See
21 AM. JUR.PROOFOF FACTS,Sexual Sterilization 95 3, 5 , 6, 11, 12 (1968).
A sterilization operation might be sought for eugenic purposes (to prevent hereditary
transmission of genetic defects), contraceptive purposes (to terminate the capacity to
procreate for any of a variety of possible reasons), or therapeutic purposes (to preserve the
life or health of the patient). This Comment deals only with sterilization performed for
eugenic or contraceptive purposes. Therapeutic sterilization can be independently justified on health grounds and is not within the scope of this paper.
2. The term "mentally retarded" is a vague term, with a myriad of possible meanings. The concept was defined by the American Association on Mental Deficiency (1973):
"Mental Retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifested during the develCOMMITTEE
ON MENTAL
RETARDATION,
MENTAL
RETARDATION
opmental period." PRESIDENT'S
143 (1977). In common parlance, it is generally thought to refer to any
PASTAND PRESENT
person with an IQ that is below average. The difficulties and inconsistencies involved in
labeling mental retardation are discussed in the text accompanying notes 114-32 infra.
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dations will be made for the basic components of a comprehensive
sterilization statute.

A.

Voluntary Sterilization3

Many states, either by statute4 or court d e c i ~ i o nexpressly
,~
allow a legally competent adult to be sterilized a t his own volition, and the remaining states would probably not take any action to prevent such a voluntary sterilization. Although the
United States Supreme Court has not yet found it necessary to
address the precise question, it is likely that the right of a competent person to voluntarily subject himself to sterilization falls
within the constitutional right of privacy espoused in Griswold u.
Connecticut6 and subsequent cases. In Griswold, the Supreme
Court declared that there is a right of privacy protected by several
constitutional guarantees and the penumbras emanating from
them.' In Roe v. Wade,Vhe Court elaborated this concept by
explaining that the right of privacy protects activities relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education? Then, in Carey v. Population Services
International,lo the Court emphasized that "[tlhe decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of. . .
constitutionally protected choice^."^^ This broad area of constitutionally protected privacy will almost certainly be interpreted as
extending to decisions regarding sterilization of oneself. At least
one state court has suggested that this is so.12
3. Voluntary sterilization refers to any sterilization performed pursuant to the voluntary, informed consent of a competent person. Although a voluntary sterilization can be
performed for eugenic or therapeutic reasons, the term normally refers to contraceptive
sterilization. See note 1 supra.
4. E.g., OR. REV. STAT.§ 435.305 (1977); VA. CODE4 32-423 (Supp. 1977).
5. E.g., Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969);
Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held that a statute forbidding the use
of contraceptives violated the constitutionally protected right of privacy. Id. a t 483-86.
7. Id. a t 484-85.
8. 410 U S . 113 (1973). The Court in Roe held that the right of privacy is broad enough
to cover the decision of a pregnant woman to obtain an abortion. I t determined, however,
that this right is not absolute and that compelling state interests such as protection of
health, medical standards, and prenatal life become dominant a t certain points during
pregnancy. Id. a t 153-54.
9. Id. a t 152-53.
10. 431 U S . 678 (1977). Carey invalidated a New York statute which proscribed the
sale or distribution of contraceptives t o minors under the age of 16 and prohibited anyone
other than a licensed pharmacist from distributing contraceptives to persons over age 16.
11. Id. a t 685. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U S . 438, 453 (1972).
12. Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 748, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366
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B. Compulsory Sterilization Statutes
The statutes of twenty-four states still retain provisions for
the compulsory sterilization of mentally defective persons.13 Although most of these statutes have not yet been tested in court,
their constitutionality rests on Supreme Court precedent. Ever
since Mr. Justice Holmes' now-famous 1927 declaration in Buck
u. Bellt4 that "[t] hree generations of imbeciles are enough, "15
involuntary sterilization statutes have generally been upheld as
a valid exercise of the police power of the state.16 Although the
legal authority for these statutes remains viable, however, it by
no means remains unchallenged. The decision in Buck, upholding
Virginia's compulsory sterilization statute, was premised on the
supposed hereditary nature of feeblemindedness, a pervasive belief of that day.17Most of today's authorities, however, doubt that
most types of mental retardation are hereditary,18 and many
scholars surmise that the holding of Buck v. Bell would be reversed if the Court were to reconsider it today.l"dditionally,
some involuntary sterilization statutes have been invalidated on
the grounds that they failed to satisfy the constitutional guarantees of procedural due processz0 or equal p r o t e ~ t i o n .Also,
~ ~ as
(1969). See also Ferro v. Lavine, 46 A.D.2d 313, 362 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1974); Casey & RobAM.L. 303,319-20; Comment, A Constitubins, Patients' Rights, 1974-1975ANN.SURVEY
tional Evaluation of Statutory and Administrative Impediments to Voluntary
Sterilization, 14 J. FAM.L. 67, 74-77 (1975).
13. Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes: A Constitutional Re-evaluation, 14 J .
FAM.L. 280, 280 n.2 (1975).
14. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
15. Id. a t 207.
16. E.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95,
221 S.E.2d 307 (1976); Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224,495 P.2d 768 (1972). But see Osborne
v. Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 185 A.D. 902, 171
N.Y.S. 1094 (1918).
17. See Comment, Sexual Sterilization: A New Rationale?, 26 ARK.L. REV. 353,35356 (1972) [hereinafter cited as New Rationale].
18. Notes 133-42 and accompanying text infra.
19. E.g., Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIOST.
L.J. 591, 596 (1966); Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?,
62 CALIF.L. REV.917, 921-24 (1974).
20. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973); In re Opinion of
Justices, 230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2
(1921); In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942). The minimum due
process safeguards that would seem to be required by Buck and these decisions are (1) a
finding that the operation is in the best interests of the person to be sterilized or of society; (2) reasonable notice, including notice to the parents or guardian of a minor or incompetent; (3) a hearing; (4) representation; (5) opportunity for confrontation and crossexamination; and (6) the availability of appellate review.
21. E.g:, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge,
201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85
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applied to criminals, a few such statutes have been invalidated
as a form of cruel and unusual p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~
Although most sterilization statutes were passed under the
same questionable presumption relied on by the Supreme Court
in Buck, today they are defended on other grounds, such as the
state's interest in preventing the birth of children to unfit pare n t ~ and
; ~ ~it is possible that the Supreme Court would uphold
these statutes on such a ground. These justifications, however,
have been criticized by some who feel that most of the existing
statutes could still not satisfy the required "compelling state interest testeUz4
The criticisms of compulsory sterilization statutes
may be regarded as further evidence of the growing sentiment
that procreation is a fundamental right that should not be infringed by the state, either by prohibiting voluntary or by compelling involuntary sterilization.

C. Court Ordered Sterilization Absent Statutory Authorization
Many courts have been presented with petitions to order or
authorize the sterilization of mentally retarded persons when no
state statute specifically authorized the court to grant the requests. Such petitions have been filed by parents, guardians, and
public officersz5seeking to have a minorz6or adultn child or ward
sterilized. These cases have not generally wrestled with the power
of a parent to consent to the operation, but rather with the power
N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913); Osborne v. Thompson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 185 A.D. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918).
22. E.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (statute allowing sterilization
of criminal convicted of rape); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914) (statute
requiring vasectomy upon any man twice convicted of a felony), rev'd on other grounds,
242 U S . 468 (1917).
23. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F.
Supp. 451, 458 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 102-03, 221
S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (1976); Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224, 230,495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972);
Ferster, supra note 19, a t 601-02; Comment, Sexual Sterilization-Constitutional Validity
of Involuntary Sterilization and Consent Determinative of Voluntariness, 40 Mo. L. REV.
509, 515-20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sexual Sterilization].
24. See, e.g., Murdock, supra note 19, a t 921-32; Comment, Sterilization of Mental
L. REV.174, 179-86 (1975).
Defectives: Compulsion and Consent, 27 BAYLOR
State regulation of certain fundamental rights can be justified only by a compelling
state interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U S . 113, 155 (1973). Procreation has been recognized as
such a right. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U S . 678, 685-86 (1977).
25. E.g., Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968) (action by county health
officer and local medical society).
26. E.g., In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (parents sought sterilization of 13year-old retarded girl).
27. E.g., Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974) (petitioner was the father and legal guardian of adult incompetent).
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of a court, in the absence of specific statutory authorization, to
order it.2R
A few courts have found sufficient authority to grant such
petitions. In the 1976 case of In re Sallmaier,29the court relied on
its parens patriae powers to authorize the sterilization of a mentally retarded woman, although no state statute authorized such
an order. In approving the sterilization requested by the mother
of the twenty-three-year-old incompetent, the court explained
that the rationale of parens patriae is that "the state must intervene in order to protect an individual who is not able to make
decisions in his own best interest."30 Finding the proposed sterilization to be in the best interest of the incompetent, the court
authorized the ~ p e r a t i o n . ~ ~
-

-

28. In Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978), the United States Supreme Court
held that an Indiana judge acted within his jurisdiction in entertaining a petition by a
mother to authorize the sterilization of her minor child. Because the judge could properly
consider such a petition, the judge was protected from civil liability for any order made
in disposing of the petition by an absolute judicial immunity. The Court did not consider
whether the decision to order the sterilization was a proper exercise of jurisdiction, however, nor did it discuss the propriety of the order in light of the consent of the child's
mother.
29. 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
30. Id. a t 297, 378 N.Y.S.2d a t 991 (quoting In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 756,
360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1974)).
31. 85 Misc. 2d a t 297-98, 378 N.Y.S.2d a t 991.
The conclusion reached by the Sallmaier court is open to criticism on the ground that
the court based its decision on questionable authority. The court found its jurisdiction to
order the sterilization in the "common law jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act as
parens patriae with respect to incompetents." Id. a t 297, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 991. The court
explained the rationale of parens patriae by citing In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360
N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1974):
[ v h e State must intervene in order to protect an individual who is not able
to make decisions in his own best interest. The decision to exercise the power
of parens patriae must reflect the welfare of society, as a whole, but mainly it
must balance the individual's right to be free from interference against the
individual's need to be treated, if treatment would in fact be in his best interest.
Id. a t 756, 360 N.Y.S.2d a t 786.
The court in Weberlist wrestled with the scope of the state's parens patriae powers.
It concluded that its responsibility was to decide what the incompetent ward would choose
if he were in a position to make a sound judgment. Accordingly, the court authorized
dental work, hand surgery, surgery for the cleft palate and jaw, and intracranial surgery
for facial restoration for the retarded ward. The court heard evidence that these operations
would provide the ward's only chance to live a life outside of an institution. Because no
person with a close family relationship could be located to consent to the surgery, the court
felt that its parens patriae position in relation to the 22-year-old retarded man allowed it
to consent for him.
The Weberlist court was not faced with an operation of the same magnitude as a
sterilization operation. Rather, it was dealing with an operation which could only be
beneficial, and of the type which courts have traditionally allowed parents to have performed on their children. Extracting from this case the principle that a court may author-
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In In re S i m p ~ o n probably
,~~
the only other reported case
wherein general equitable powers were invoked to order the sterilization of a feebleminded girl, the court relied on both statutory
and general equitable powers.33The precedential value of this
decision has been clouded, however, by subsequent federal court
decisions. Nearly ten years after Simpson a federal court ruled in
Wade u. Bethesda Hospital34that the Simpson judge was civilly
liable to another feebleminded girl who had been sterilized pursuant to court order under circumstances similar to Simpson. The
court held that a statutory grant of "plenary power a t law and in
equity fully to dispose of any matter properly before the court"
was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the judge to order the
sterilization of a feebleminded 17-year-old girl.35Finding that the
judge acted "wholly without jurisdiction," the court ruled that he
was not protected by judicial immunity and could, therefore, be
held liable for having ordered the s t e r i l i z a t i ~ n .This
~ ~ decision
minimized the precedential value of Simpson. But, the Wade
holding has since been called into serious question by a recent
Supreme Court ruling.
~ ~United States Supreme Court
In Stump v. S p ~ r k r n a nthe
overturned a decision of the Seventh Circuit which had applied
the logic of Wade to deny judicial immunity to a judge who had
authorized the sterilization of a 15-year-old allegedly retarded girl
upon the petition of her mother.38In reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled that a statutory conferral of
"original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases a t law and in equity
whatsoever" was sufficiently broad to clothe the judge with absolute judicial immunity in ruling on a petition for ~terilization.~'
Although this decsion indicates that the denial of judicial immunity in Wade may have been erroneous, it does not address the
question of whether a court may properly order the sterilization
of any person without specific statutory authorization. Rather, it
holds that a broad conferral of statutory jurisdiction assures that
ize the sterilization of a retarded ward solely on the basis of its parens patriae power is
questionable at best.
32. 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
33. Id. at 207-08.
Ohio 1971).
34. 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.
35. Id. at 673-74.
36. Id. at 674.
37. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
38. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), reu'd sub norn. Stump v.
Sparkman, 98 S . Ct. 1099 (1978).
39. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978).

386

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

a court may properly consider a petition requesting sterilization,
so as to relieve a judge from liability for any order he might make
in acting upon the petition. But while a judge may not be held
liable for ordering sterilization in such circumstances, the Court
did not indicate whether it was a proper exercise of the general
equitable powers of a court to make such an order.
Implicit support for the theory advanced in Sallmaier and
Simpson can arguably be found in Wyatt v. Aderholt.'O In that
case a federal district court judge set up standards and procedural
due process safeguards to be followed by Alabama authorities in
having retarded inmates of public institutions sterilized. The
standards were promulgated and sterilizations implicitly condoned even though Alabama's compulsory sterilization statute
had been declared uncon~titutional.~~
It is not likely, however,
that the court intended to assert that the inherent, nonstatutory
power of a court includes the power to order the sterilization of a
mentally retarded person; the problem created by the absence of
valid statutory authorization was not addressed by the court."
The weight of authority is to the effect that courts do not
possess inherent or equitable nonstatutory power to authorize
involuntary sterilization of any person.43The Missouri Supreme
Court, for example, stated that the "awesome power" to deny a
child the right of procreation may not be inferred from the general
40. 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
41. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
42. In the first of the two Aderholt cases, 368 F . Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973),a threejudge district court held unconstitutional an Alabama statute which permitted the sterilization of mentally retarded inmates of public institutions a t the unfettered discretion of
the officials of such institutions, because the statute contained no requirements of notice,
hearing, or other procedural safeguards. In the second case, less than three weeks later,
the single-judge district court found it necessary to establish standards and safeguards to
be followed in future sterilizations because, as the court put it, "it appears that sterilization continues to be performed in certain instances by the state health authorities." 368
F. Supp. a t 1384. The court did not address the problem created by the fact that the
declaration of unconstitutionality left the state with no valid authority to perform any
sterilization. Rather, it was concerned with establishing standards so that no future sterilizations would be performed without adequate procedural safeguards. The court did not
explain why it simply failed to enjoin the state authorities from performing all sterilizations until the legislature could enact a new statute with adequate safeguards. Instead,
the court performed the legislative function of establishing standards to be followed. The
court did, however, have the benefit of knowing that the authorized representatives of the
state approved of the sterilization of mentally retarded inmates. It was the procedure of
the statute that was found inadequate, not the desired result.
43. E.g., Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Guardianship
of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d
579 (Ky. 1968); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In re D.D., 90 Misc. 2d 236,
394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1977); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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language of the Missouri juvenile code, even though the child's
parents might desire the operation." A California appellate court
likewise refused to find in the "chancery power" of a state probate
court the power to order the sterilization of an adult incompetent .45
The issues dealt with above, however, are not dispositive of
the main concern of this Comment-the power of parents to have
their retarded minor children sterilized. The consent of a parent
to the sterilization of his child cannot render the operation
"voluntary." Furthermore, the fact that involuntary sterilization
statutes are generally upheld does not speak to the power of a
parent, absent statutory authorization, to have a child sterilized.
Similarly, cases debating the inherent power of a court to sanction a nonconsensual sterilization do not resolve the question of
a parent's inherent power to sanction the procedure. Consequently, attention will now turn specifically to the common law
power and control of parents over their children.

A. Parental Authority Generally
The rights and duties of parents to protect, care for, maintain, preserve, and educate their children have deep roots in both
our legal and sociological heritage.46Furthermore, these natural
rights are of constitutional dimensions." The United States Supreme Court recognized the sanctity of the parent-child relationship when it declared,
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. . . . And it is in recognition of this that
these decisions have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.48
44. In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Mo. 1974).
45. Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
46. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972);Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651-52 (1972); People v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952); In re
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673,685,126 P.2d 765,771 (1942); Hafen, Children's Liberation and
the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations A bout Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights,"
1976 B.Y.U. L. R~v.,605,615-29; Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some
Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE
DAME
LAW. 133, 137 (1972); Note, State Intrusion into Family
Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN.L. REV. 1383, 1384 n.7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Intrusion].
47. See Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976), and United States Supreme Court cases cited therein.
48. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.158, 166 (1944) (citation omitted).
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Another court has said, "A fundamental premise on which our
society is based is that courts will zealously guard the integrity
of the parent-child relationship. . . . A parent's right to the
custody and control of his or her minor child will not be abridged
except for the most powerful reasons."49The California Supreme
Court explained that the right to the custody and control of a
child "embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the
rearing of a child, including its care. It includes . . . the right to
direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and
control, education, health, and religion."50

B. Medical Treatment
Consistent with the common law attitude toward parental
authority, decisions regarding the care of a young child and the
medical and surgical treatment he receives have traditionally
been made by the parents.51Consequently, to avoid civil liability,
parental consent must normally be obtained by medical personnel before a child is treated,52and the parental consent will not
normally be ~ h a l l e n g e dHowever,
.~~
although parental discretion
is broad, it is not absolute. The state as parens patriae, for example, has the duty to protect those who cannot protect themselves.54Thus, the state may interfere with parental authority
when parents have unreasonably refused or neglected to provide
medical treatment essential to the protection of their child's life
or health.55Furthermore, the police power of the state enables it
to safeguard the public health and safety and therefore to compel
submission to preventive measures such as compulsory vaccina49. In re Welfare of May, 14 Wash. App. 765, 767, 545 P.2d 25, 26 (1976) (citation
omitted).
50. Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953).
51. See Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 586, 107 S.E. 785
(1921). See also Burge v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 608, 617, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (1953);
Hafen, supra note 46, a t 648-49.
52. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1,260 N.W. 99 (1935); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673,
126 P.2d 765 (1942); Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, a t 521.
In emergency situations, however, parental consent is not required. See Tabor v.
Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Ky. 1952); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 134-35, 136
N.W. 1106, 1110-11 (1912). See also KAN.STAT.4 65-2891 (Supp. 1976); MASS.GEN.LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1977-78).
53. See In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673,
126 P.2d 765 (1942).
54. Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422,430,114 A.2d 1,5, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942 (1955).
55. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d
314, 316 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1952); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947). See State Intrusion, supra note 46, a t 1399-1401.
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t i ~ or
n ~terilization,~'
~ ~
even in the face of parental opposition.
A parent's power and control over his child's medical treatment may also be limited by the age and situation of the child
himself. A minor who is emancipateds8or mature enough to make
a competent decisions9 is sometimes recognized as having the
capacity and right to consent to medical treatment for himself,60
even though the parent may not approve." The decision to obtain
an abortion, for example, is a constitutionally protected choice
even for a minor.'j2 Thus, in Planned Parenthood u. D a n f ~ r t h , ' ~
probably the first Supreme Court decision to deal squarely with
conflicting constitutional rights of parents and children in the
context of medical treatment, the Court invalidated the portion
of a Missouri abortion statute which required the consent of the
parents before an abortion could be performed on an unmarried
minor. The Court determined that it was constitutionally impermissbile for a state to endow the parents with an "absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnan~y."'~The Court felt
that "[alny independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant."" Presumably, a mentally retarded minor who could satisfy the competency requirement
would be accorded the same rights.
It is not clear to what extent this principle is applicable in
other contexts, nor by what criteria competency is to be measured." Nevertheless, it shows the sensitivity of the Supreme
56. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905); Dunn, The Availability of Abortion, Sterilization, and Other Medical Teatment
for Minor Patients, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV.1, 4 (1975). Cf. Dowel1 v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d
859 (Okla. 1954) (fluoridation of city water supply), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
57. Note 16 and accompanying text supra.
58. For a discussion of emancipation statutes, see Dunn, supra note 56, a t 5-7.
59. For a discussion of the "mature minor" concept, see Wadlington, Minors and
HALLL.J. 115, 117-20 (1973).
Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE
60. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp.
& School of Nursing, 205 Kan. 292, 300-02, 469 P.2d 330, 337 (1970); Bakker v. Welsh,
144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S.
575 (N.Y.City Ct. 1935); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16,21-22,431 P.2d 719,723 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,72-75 (1976);In re Green,
448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
62. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
63. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
64. Id. a t 74.
65. Id. at 75.
66. The implications of the competency standard used in Danforth are far from clear.
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Court to the rights of competent minor children to participate in
decisions regarding their own medical treatment, and at the same
time emphasizes that parents do not have absolute control over
their children in all situations.

C . Sterilization of Retarded Children
A parent's attempt to have a retarded child sterilized arises
in a different context than the situations considered thus far.
When parental discretion regarding medical treatment for children is formally challenged in court, the allegation is usually that
the parents have failed to provide or have refused to allow certain
medical treatment for their children deemed appropriate or necessary by a third party. Much less common are cases challenging
the adequacy of parental consent when parents have sought to
obtain or have consented to surgical treatment for their children.
Presumably this is because the parents' decision seldom comes to
the attention of many other people; there are seldom external
indications that something is amiss, as there are when a parent
refuses to provide necessary treatment.
Most cases dealing with the adequacy of parental consent to
medical treatment of minor children arise when a doctor refuses
to provide requested services and the parents petition the court
to authorize or order the treatment. As noted above, these decisions have usually turned on the court's authority or jurisdiction
to order the treatment and not on the capacity of the parents to
consent. Nevertheless, despite the infrequency of decisions dealing directly with the capacity of parents to authorize surgical
treatment which is not clearly in the child's best interests, some
cases have dealt with this question, although often by implication
only. The decisions are not uniform, however, either in the sterilization context or as to other surgical measure^.^'
The Court speaks in terms of the "right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough
to have become pregnant," id., but it is unlikely that the Court meant to establish a
puberty standard of competence. This becomes evident in light of the Court's subsequent
emphasis of the fact that the holding "does not suggest that every minor, regardless of
age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy."Id.
67. In In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 338
(La. 1973), the court held that neither the parents nor the court could authorize the surgical removal of a kidney from a 17-year-old retarded boy for the purpose of donating it
to his sister. In Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), however, the inherent
chancery powers of the court were found sufficient upon the petition of the mother to
authorize a kidney transplant for a 27-year-old incompetent to his brother who was dying
of a fatal kidney disease. Although the incompetent's committee, who was his mother,
was found to lack the statutory power to authorize the operation, weight was given to the
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1. Cases implying that a parent may consent

Although no reported case has ever directly held that parents
possess the power to authorize the sterilization of their retarded
children, some courts have implied that such a power exists. In
Holmes v. Powers,6Rfor example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that no statutory or common law authority permitted the
sterilization of a 35-year-old mentally retarded woman upon the
petition of a county health officer and a local medical society. The
court said, "If, as alleged and proved, the appellee is in fact
mentally incompetent, she does not have legal capacity to consent to anything. Nor, at her age, does the law give her parents
any control of her person or p r ~ p e r t y . "This
~ ~ language has been
interpreted as implying that a parent could legally consent to the
sterilization of a mentally retarded minor
A federal district court for Ohio likewise implied that a parent's consent might be sufficient to relieve those involved in the
sterilization of a retarded child from liability. In Wade v. Be~
girl, who had been sterilized
thesda H ~ s p i t a l a, ~feebleminded
pursuant to a court order upon petition by the state welfare
board, brought an action against the judge who had ordered the
sterilization and seven others who had been involved in the operation. The defendants contended that the plaintiff-child had consented to the operation. The court responded to this contention
by saying "there is . . . no signed document before this Court
which demonstrates that either the plaintiff or her parents consented to the ~ p e r a t i o n . "This
~ ~ language suggests that the written consent of the child's parents could have relieved the defendants from liability,73thus implying that the parents could
properly have had such an operation performed.
In a 1974 Missouri case, In re M. K. R.,74the mother of a 13year-old retarded girl had petitioned the juvenile division of a
fact t h a t all the members of the incompetent's immediate family recommended the
transplant. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), the court implied that the
parents of a 15-year-old boy could have authorized skin grafts from their son for the
benefit of his cousin. Likewise, in Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (1933), the court
implied that the parents of a minor girl could consent to blood transfusions from their
daughter for the benefit of another person.
68. 439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968).
69. Id. a t 580 (emphasis added).
70. Neuwirth, Capacity, Competence, Consent: Voluntary Sterilization of the MenRIGHTSL. REV. 447, 454 (1974-75).
tally Retarded, 6 COLUM.HUMAN
71. 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
72. Id. a t 383 (emphasis added).
73. See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra.
74. 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974).
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state circuit court to approve the sterilization of the young girl.
The father of the child also filed his written consent to the operation. The juvenile court, concluding that the sterilization "would
be conducive to the child's welfare and to the best interests of the
state," approved the operation.75The Missouri Supreme Court,
however, reversed upon a determination that no court in the state
had the statutory or constitutional authority to sanction such an
operation." Before reaching this decision, however, the court considered and briefly responded to a contention which the girl's
mother considered to be a "hard-core" question. In the words of
the mother:
Is this . . . court prepared to single out sterilization from
. . . the . . . other medical and surgical procedures . . . which
parents daily consent [to] and obtain for the benefit of their
minor children . . . [and thereby presume] to second guess the
best judgment of the child's own mother, a judgment . . , based
upon sound medical evidence . . .?77

The court's answer to this "hard-core question" was a simple
"no." The court explained that "[ilt is the petitioner who has
singled out sterilization from those other surgical procedures and
asked the courts to 'authorize,' or put what petitioner deems to
be a necessary stamp of approval on her 'best judgment' as to
what is necessary for her child."78
This dictum has been interpreted by at least one writer as
an indication that the court would not have excluded sterilization
from the operations to which parents can consent on behalf of
their minor children, so that parents could properly have a child
sterilized without resort to the court.79
It is not clear, however, that the court intended to imply
support for such a position. In a subsequent paragraph, the court
said:
The courts are not faced in this case with a prayer for a judgment authorizing ordinary medical treatment, or radical surgery
necessary to preserve the life of a child; we are faced with a
request for sanction by the state of what no doubt is a routine
75. Id. at 469.
76. Id. at 470.
77. Id. at 469.
78. Id.
79. Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, at 521. It is interesting, however, that the
comment supports the position that sterilization should not be one of the operations for
which parental consent alone is adequate.
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operation which would irreversibly deny to a human being a
fundamental right, the right to bear or beget a child?

The court was not called upon to decide, nor did it decide,
whether a parent could properly authorize the sterilization of a
child without resort to the judiciary. It does appear, however, that
the court would have given its "stamp of approval" had the
mother been seeking authorization for ordinary medical treatment or for radical surgery necessary for the preservation of the
child's life. It refused, however, to authorize sterilization of a
retarded child even with the consent of both parents, thereby
recognizing a distinct difference between sterilization, an operation which would permanently terminate a fundamental right,
and other types of ordinary or necessary medical treatment.
2.

Cases holding or implying that a parent may not consent

In the only reported case to expressly discuss the power of a
parent to subject a minor child to sexual sterilization, A. L. v.
G.R.H.,81an Indiana court held that parents do not have the
common law power to authorize the sterilization of a child for
reasons other than medical necessity. In that case, the mother of
a 15-year-oldboy of less than normal intelligence sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the common law attributes of
the parent-child relationship endowed her with the right to have
her son sterilized. The trial court denied the mother the right to
secure the operation and the court of appeals affirmed."
The boy involved in this case had an intelligence quotient
(IQ) of eighty-seven, described as being in the "dull" or
"borderline" area, only seven points below the normal range.
Witnesses testified that he had benefitted substantially from special education programs and would be capable of earning his own
livelihood. Furthermore, evidence showed that his mental disability would not be transmittable to offspring and that he was
intelligent enough to participate in a decision about sterilization." The court, no doubt influenced somewhat by these factors,
expressly held that parents do not have the inherent power to
authorize the sterilization of their retarded minor children.
In the course of its decision, the appellate court pointed out
that: (1)there was no legislative enactment which would permit
-

80.
81.
82.
83.

-

515 S.W.2d at 470.
325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
325 N.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 501-02.

-

.
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sterilization under the circumstances of the case; (2) the facts did
not bring the case within the framework of the decisions recognizing that a parent may consent to necessary medical services on
behalf of the child; and (3) the case did not present a situation
where the state may intervene over the parent's wishes to rescue
a child from parental neglect or to save its life?' The court recognized that the desirability of the proposed operation did not emanate from any lifesaving necessity, but rather that the sole purpose of the operation was to prevent the boy's capability of fathering children.85The court concluded, "We believe the common law
does not invest parents with such power over their children even
though they sincerely believe the child's adulthood would benefit
therefrom
Implicit support for this conclusion can be found in a variety
of cases. In In re D.D.,87for example, a New York Surrogate
Court denied the application of a mother seeking to have her 16year-old mentally retarded daughter sterilized. The girl, although
attractive and well developed, functioned below the level of a
5-year-old because of severe mental retardation." Although the
application was denied because the court found no statutory
power to authorize such an operation, the case is noteworthy
because the court gave little deference to the fact that the petitioner was the mother of the minor girl. The court did not even
suggest that her position as a parent endowed her with the inherent authority to consent to the procedure.
In Relf v. Weinberger," a federal district court declared that
federal funds could not be used to provide for the sterilization of
any person who is incompetent to consent to such an operation
because of minority or mental deficiency. The court explained
that the decision was based on statutory interpretation. The family planning sections of the federal statutes in question required
a voluntary consent to such an operation? The court felt that no
incompetent person could provide such a consent, and that the
consent of a representative could not impute voluntariness to the
person being sterilized? Under this rationale, parental consent to
84. Id. at 502.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 90 Misc. 2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
88. Id. at 236, 394 N.Y.S.Bd at 140.
89. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
90. Public Health Service Act § 1007, 42 U.S.C. 4 300a-5 (1970); Social Security Act
§ § 402(2)(15), 508(a), 1905 (a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § § 602(a)(15), 708(a), 1396d(a)(4) (1970).
91. 372 F. Supp. at 1202.
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the sterilization of a child would not make it a voluntary sterilization.
Another federal district court invalidated a portion of the
North Carolina sterilization statute because it provided that sterilization proceedings must be instituted whenever the next of kin
or legal guardian of a retarded person so requested." The court
invalidated this provision because "it grants to the retarded person's next of kin or legal guardian the power of a tyrant: for any
reason, or for no reason at all, he may require an otherwise responsible public servant to initiate the procedure."" The provision was declared unconstitutional as an "arbitrary and capricious delegation of unbridled power."" Although a retarded
child's next of kin will normally be his parents, the court refused
to allow them to have the power to require the initiation of sterilization proceeding^.^^
Another court, in establishing standards to be followed by
Alabama state health authorities whenever a resident of a state
retardation facility was to be sterilized, totally banned the sterilization of any resident who had not obtained the chronological age
exception
of 21 years except in cases of medical neces~ity.~Wo
was made for the sterilization of any such person upon the parents' request or consent.
~ h e i cases
e
suggest that parental consent alone is not sufficient to authorize the sterilization of a retarded child, a t least
when governmental agencies are involved. However, with only
one case expressly declaring that parents do not possess the power
to have their children sterilized, and other cases containing implications both ways, one would be bold, if not presumptuous, to
assert a definitive common law doctrine on the precise issue.
Nevertheless, A.L. v. G.R.H. and the other more recent cases
seem to show the modern trend. In light of the continually expanding recognition of the constitutional rights of children and
the mentally retarded, it appears to be a reasonable assumption
that most courts would not recognize parental authority to the
extent of allowing a parent to have any retarded child sterilized
a t will.
92. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451,
455-56 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
93. Id. at 456 (emphasis in original).
94. Id.
95. It should be noted, however, that the court implied that the breadth of the
delegation was the major infirmity. "We think such confidence in all next of kin and all
legal guardians is misplaced . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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Although the power of a parent to have his mentally retarded
minor child sterilized appears never to have been fully recognized
by the courts, and the current trend is away from recognizing
such power, inquiry as to whether parents should have such power
is still relevant. Many courts may still have to pass on the question and legislatures may also have to decide whether to grant
such power by statute. In addition, although corroborating statistics are difficult to obtain, it appears that many retarded children
are still being sterilized upon the consent of their parents without
resort to the courts and without statutory authorization." Tacitly
recognizing parental power to this extent may jeopardize the
basic right of a retarded child to procreate. On the other hand,
denying the power may interfere with parental discretion and the
right of the child to have his parents act in his best interests in
all situations. It is with these facts in mind that attention will
now be turned to a discussion of the more relevant policy considerations.
A. Policy Considerations Favoring Parental Authority
As discussed above, parents have a constitutional right to the
custody, care, and control of their minor children? Although this
right is not absolute, parental discretion as to the proper medical
treatment for any child should not be interfered with in the absence of compelling reasons. In addition to the parental rights
involved, the rights of a retarded child would also be impaired if
his parents were denied the power to have a necessary or beneficial sterilization performed. And sterilization may indeed be beneficial for a retarded child in some situation^.^^ Under such circumstances, the inability of parents to obtain a sterilization for
their child would frustrate the rights and best interests of everyone involved.
Additionally, even if a statutory procedure were designed to
provide for the sterilization of retarded children, it would necessarily entail state interference with parental discretion and family privacy. And state interference with familial affairs ofttimes
produces worse results than no intervention a t all.lw One court
97. See Ferster, supra note 19, at 605; Murdock, supra note 19, at 918-19, 932.
98. Notes 46-53 and accompanying text supra.
99. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451,
454-55 (1976); Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, at 515-20.
L.J.
100. See Green & Paul, Parenthood and the Mentally Retarded, 24 U . TORONTO
117, 123-24 (1974); Hafen, supra note 46, at 655-56.
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recently explained, "Modern theories of child welfare . . . offer
persuasive support to parental rights, and suggest that the legal
system should generally defer to the wishes of a child's parents,
obliging the state to bear a serious burden of justification before
intervention."lol Sterilization is an operation with far-reaching
consequences and parents certainly should be in the best position
to evaluate these consequences in terms of their children's best
interests. lo2
Furthermore, it would be in keeping with the common beliefs
and assumptions of the general populace to recognize parents as
possessing the power and ability to have a retarded child sterilized when they feel it is desirable and beneficial for the child.lo3
Many parents would likely be offended a t the suggestion that
unless the state gives them the power they may not have a retarded child sterilized even when they and their doctor feel it
would be desirable.
The requirement of parental consent for medical treatment
of a minor is based largely on the assumption that a child lacks
the knowledge, maturity, and intelligence necessary to reach a
decision concerning his own best interests.lo4Because sterilization
involves a fundamentally important right and because most children will be able to decide for themselves a t a later date whether
or not they wish to be sterilized, most would agree that the decision should be left for the children to make when they are competent to make it. Some retarded children, however, will never be
able to make a competent decision regarding sterilization. It
seems natural, therefore, to conclude that in such a situation the
parents, who are presumed to be acting in the best interests of
the child, should be able to make the decision for the child.
Viewing only the above policies, the ideal solution would
seem to be a legislative enactment granting parents the authority
to consent to the sterilization of a retraded child when they feel
it would be in the child's best interests, with no further state
involvement at all-provide statutory authorization and leave
the decision with the parents. The validity of such legislation,
however, would certainly be questionable in light of recent Supreme Court declarations that blanket parental consent require101. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976) (quoting State Intrusion,
supra note 46, at 1385).
102. See In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 109, 221 S.E.2d 307, 316 (1976).
103. See State Intrusion, supra note 46, at 1384 n.7.
104. See Dunn, supra note 56, at 2.
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ments are impermissible in statutes dealing with procreation.lo5
Moreover, there are several countervailing considerations suggesting that parents should not possess unfettered discretion to
have a retarded child sterilized, whether it is statutorily authorized or not. Attention will now be turned to a discussion of several
such considerations.

B. Policy Considerations Against Parental Authority
I . Procreation as a fundamental right
Many have argued that an operation which would permanently terminate the ability of a child to reproduce should not be
among the medical procedures that a parent can routinely authorize for a mentally retarded child.lo6Most people would certainly agree that a parent should not have the right to withhold
medical treatment which would save the life of his child or authorize treatment which would unreasonably endanger it. The
child's fundamental right to life itself surely outweighs any conflicting parental interest. Although of a different magnitude than
the right to life itself, sterilization likewise threatens a fundamental right, the right to procreate.lo7The right of privacy as it pertains to matters concerning procreation is a right protected
against unwarranted state infringement for all, whether minors or
adults.lo8The sterilization of a child, be he retarded nor not, irreversibly denies him this fundamental right to bear or beget
children.
Although a parent's discretion as to medical treatment for a
retarded child should be broad, the child's fundamental right to
procreate is arguably superior. To deny a parent the unfettered
105. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U S . 678, 693-94 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J., with three Justices concurring in the opinion, six Justices concurring in the
result); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976).
A statutory provision giving parents an absolute veto power over a competent minor's
decision to be sterilized would likely be invalidated under the Danforth test. However, a
sterilization statute containing a parental consent element which also provides a check
against unfettered parental discretion would likely withstand judicial scrutiny. See note
150 infra.
106. Green & Paul, supra note 100, at 122-24;Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 455; Sexual
Sterilization, supra note 23, at 521-22. Attorney General opinions of at least two states
have concluded that a mentally deficient person may not normally be sterilized upon the
application or consent of the parents. See 1943 ATT'YGEN.REP.336 (N.Y.); Ferster, supra
note 19, at 605.
107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo. 1974).
108. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U S . 678, 692-93 (1977) (Brennan, J., with
three Justices concurring); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
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right to have a child sterilized is to infringe on his discretion
somewhat. To deny a child the power of procreation is to destroy
the possibility of his ever exercising and enjoying the rights and
duties of parenthood. Although the interests of the parents in
seeking the sterilization of their retarded child need not always
conflict with the best interests of the child, it is apparent that
these interests can and do conflict in many circumstances. Common sense would seem to dictate the conclusion that if the rights
and interests of the parents conflict with those of the child in this
area, the child's right to procreate should prevail.
The presumption that a parent will look to and protect the
best interests of his children is implicit in the theory that a parent
has the right to authorize surgical treatment for them.lo9As to a
mentally retarded child, however, this presumption may not always be justified. Although one should not be quick to decry the
motives of a parent who seeks to have his retarded child sterilized, there are many possible concerns and situations which
could lead the interests of the parents into conflict with the best
interests of the child.l1° The social stigma attached to reproduction by retarded persons, for example, could lead a parent to seek
to have his retarded child sterilized, as could the desire to prevent
the possible future birth of retarded grandchildren. Economic
concerns could likewise be the motivation behind a desired sterilization. The parent would very likely have to finance the prenatal
expenses as well as the medical and hospital expenses of the
actual birth. Furthermore, the retarded child could prove to be
an unfit parent and lack adequate economic means to properly
provide for the child, causing the burden of raising and providing
for the child to fall on the grandparents.
Hygienic concerns might also make sterilization an attractive alternative to the parents. Sterilization can certainly help
solve some menstrual problems and it has been claimed that
sterilization can also help with problems such as excessive masturbation and excessive body hair and acne.lll A parent seeking
to sterilize a retarded child might simply be acting out of overprotectiveness common among many parents of retarded children, or
at the other extreme, out of hostility or frustration stemming from
the added pressures of having to care for a retarded child.
109. See In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C.95, 109, 221 S.E.2d 307, 316 (1976);
Murdock, supra note 19, at 932.
110. Murdock, supra note 19, at 932-33; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 455; Sexual
Sterilization, supra note 23, a t 522.
111. See Ferster, supra note 19, at 605.
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The "true" motivation behind a parent's decision to sterilize
a retarded child, of course, would likely be a combination of many
factors and concerns. It is not contended that each of the possible
motivations described above is an improper motive or that every
one of them would tend to be in derogation of the child's best
interests. It is contended, however, that in view of the fundamental nature of the right to procreate, some such motivations are
improper. Adequate safeguards should, therefore, be required to
ensure that before any person is sterilized all relevant factors
have been properly considered so that the operation does in fact
tend to reflect the best interests and welfare of the person to be
sterilized,l12or is pursuant to a voluntary, competent consent of
such person, or is justified on some other acceptable ground.l13
The fundamental nature of the right involved requires at least
this much protection.
2. Problems in labeling

Even if it was conceded, arguendo, that a parent should possess the power to have a retarded child sterilized, a major problem persists in determining when a child is so "retarded" as to
justify sterilization. It is not an easy task to distinguish between
a "normal" child and a "retarded" child or between competency
and incompetency. In fact, the term "mentally retarded" has
very little meaning."' It describes a very broad class of people and
does not distinguish between differing causes of retardation, degrees of intellectual, mental and social capabilities, or prospects
112. This Comment does not purport to define precisely what is involved in a determination of the "best interests of the child." It would seem, however, that in reaching a
decision as to the child's best interests in the context of sexual sterilization, at least the
following factors should be taken into consideration: (1)the desires of the child's parents
and the reasons for such desires; (2) the child's ability to understand the nature and
consequences of the operation; (3) the child's desires; (4) the child's potentiality of developing into a fit parent; (5) the physical and psychological impact the proposed operation
could have on the child; and (6) the availability of a less drastic alternative which would
accomplish the desired result. Unless these factors are given proper weight and unless the
operation would tend to genuinely promote the child's best welfare, sterilization would be
improper and unjustifiable.
113. Various interests have been recognized by courts and commentators as legitimate state interests which would justify the sterilization of mental incompetents under
certain circumstances. E.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 457-58 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (to prevent the birth of a defective child
or the birth of a nondefective child to unfit parents); In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C.
95, 103, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976) (interest of the unborn child, and the interest in
preventing the procreation of children who will become a burden on the state). See also
notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra.
114. PRESIDENT'S
COMMMTEE
ON MENTAL
R~ARDATION,
NEWNEIGHBORS
27 (1974).
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for future improvement.l15 An Illinois court correctly surmised,
"[tlhere is no clear dividing line between competency and incompetency, and each case must be judged by its own peculiar
facts."l16
Disenchantment with the use of the IQ as the main criterion
for determining whether or not a person is retarded has brought
the labeling and diagnosis of retardation under increasing scrutiny."' IQ is considered by many to be an inept indicator of a
person's potential and an inaccurate measure of a person's present functional ability.l18 Indeed, many children labeled in their
youth as retarded are in adult life indistinguishable from the
unretarded and display increased and even normal intellectual
competence.119Furthermore, studies have disclosed that there is
a pronounced "cultural bias" in the standard IQ tests?
Another critical consideration is that "retardation" is not
necessarily co-extensive with inadequacy as a parent? Nearly
ninety percent of the mentally retarded persons in the United
States are only "mildly" retardedlZ2and are referred to as
"educable" mentally retarded? Many may have normal children and function as adequate parents, especially after education
and training to that end.lz4As one court explained, "It is a matter
of common knowledge that many married men or women continue in a satisfactory marital status although they may not possess high grade mentality or be successful in the conduct of business ventures . . . ."125
115. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451,
454 (M.D.N .C . 1976). See also PRESIDENT'S
COMM~ITEE
ON MENTAL
RETARDATION:
CENTURY
OF DECISION
6 (1976).
116. Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 332, 40 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1942).
LEGALASPECTSOF MENTAL
RETARDATION
10-19 (1974); Roos,
117. See R. WOODY,
Mentally Retarded Citizens: Challenge for the 19709s, 23 SYRACUSE
L. REV.1059, 1070-71
(1972).
118. See PRESIDENT'S
COMMIT~EE
ON MENTAL
RETARDATION,
supra note 2, a t 137; Murdock, supra note 19, a t 928-29 n.67; Roos, supra note 117, a t 1070-71.
119. PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE
ON MENTAL
RETARDATION,
supra note 2, at 138; Green &
Paul, supra note 100, a t 123; 19 U. TORONTO
L.J. 424 (1969).
120. P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (N.D. Cal. 1972),aff'dper curium, 502 F.2d
963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969);S. SARASON
& J. DORIS,PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
IN MENTAL
DEFICIENCY
289-311 (4th ed. 1969).
121. See Ferster, supra note 19, a t 624; Murdock, supra note 19, at 929-30, 933.
122. E. OGG,SECURING
THE LEGAL
RIGHTSOF ~ A R D E DPERSONS2 (Public Affairs
Pamphlet No. 492, 1973); Murdock, supra note 19, a t 928.
123. MENTAL
RETARDATION:
A BASICGUIDE151-55 (H. Love ed. 1968) [hereinafter
RETARDATION];
E. OGG, Supra note 122, a t 3.
cited as MENTAL
124. See Murdock, supra note 19, a t 928-32. See also In re Welfare of May, 14 Wash.
RETARDATION,
supra note 123, a t 151-55.
App. 765, 768-69,545 P;2d 25, 27 (1976); MENTAL
125. Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 335, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (1942).
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Furthermore, retardation does not preclude the capacity to
give an informed ~ 0 n s e n t .Courts
l ~ ~ have found persons with limited mental capacity able to give a legally binding consent to such
things as marriage,ln sexual intercourse,128and adoption.ln The
oft used test for determining the ability of a mentally handicapped person to enter into a legal relationship or otherwise give
a binding consent is whether the person possesses "sufficient
mental capacity to understand the nature, effect, duties and obligations" of the relationship.130 Many mentally retarded persons
can understand and appreciate the responsibilities of parenthood,
as well as the implications of sterilization.131In fact, one author
has asserted that "the state may rarely confront a retarded individual who should be sterilized, but who lacks the capacity to
consent
If the legal capacity to consent to sterilization exists, or if it
could possibly develop as the child matures, the retarded person
should be on a par with any other person. That is, he should have
the right to be sterilized if he so desires, but he should not be
subject to sterilization against his will unless it is pursuant to a
valid compulsory sterilization statute. The unsatisfactory, unreliable, and biased tests used in labeling retardation, the fact that
the overwhelming majority of mentally retarded persons are only
mildly retarded and many can be adequate parents, and the fact
that many persons, although retarded, can nonetheless meet the
requirements of legal competency to consent to sterilization,
makes the unfettered power to terminate a child's right of procreation simply because he falls into the unfortunate group of
persons who have been labeled "retarded" seem awesome indeed.
3.

Changing theories of genetics

The eugenic sterilization movement133reached its zenith during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the
126 Murdock, supra note 19, a t 933; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 452.
127 Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 40 N.E.2d 85 (1942).
128 Hacker v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 119, 118 P.2d 408 (1941).
129 In re Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 181 N.E.2d 836 (1962).
130 Ertel v. Ertel, 313 Ill. App. 326, 334, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (1942); Hacker v. State,
73 Okla Zrim. 119, 118 P.2d 408 (1941).
131 See Murdock, supra note 19, a t 933; Neuwirth, supra note 70, at 452.
132. Murcock, supra note 19, at 934.
133. "Eugenics" involves the concept of improving human stock through regulation
of heredity. he term was coined by Sir Francis Galton in the 19th century from the Greek
word, eugenes, meaning "well-born." Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis,
46 DEN.
L.J. 631, 631 (1969).
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twentieth centuries.ls4The main impetus for the eugenics movement began with Sir Francis Galton and involved the principles
of social Darwinism and Mendelian genetics.ls5The sharp decline
in recent years of the use of eugenic sterilization laws, however,
plus the recent reluctance of courts to claim hereditary justifications for such statutes, signals the rejection of the view that mental retardation is hereditary.l3"n other words, the basic premise
upon which the sterilization of mental defectives has been traditionally justified-the belief that heredity is primarily responsible for mental retardation-is no longer accepted by the general
scientific community as to most instances of mental retardation.ls7 Statistics show that eighty-nine percent of feebleminded
persons are born to normal parents.138Likewise, the President's
Committee on Mental Retardation concluded that "[a]bnormal
genes or chromosomes which generate [the] more severe
[mental] disorders account for 5% or less of the total incidence
of retardation."ls9
A federal district court, in recently invalidating parts of a
North Carolina sterilization statute, explained: "Most competent
geneticists now reject Social Darwinism and doubt the premise
implicit in Holmes' incantation that '. . . three generations of
imbeciles is enough."'140 The court then summarized, "In short,
the medical and genetical experts are no longer sold on sterilization to benefit either retarded patients or the future of the Republic."141 These changes in genetic theory cast doubt on the validity
of compulsory sterilization statutes which were passed and justified on the assumed genetic inheritability of mental retardation.ld2Furthermore, the fact that traditional justifications for
sterilization statutes are breaking down casts doubt on the acceptability of any type of involuntary sterilization, reinforcing the
134. Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1965).
135. Id. at 1060.
136. See Ferster, supra note 19, at 599; Shaw, Procreation and the Population
Problem, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1977).
137. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Bligh, supra note 134, at 1062; Ferster, supra note 19, at 596,
602-04; New Rationale, supra note 17, at 353-56.
"[Rlesearch has uncovered some 200 causes of retardation, only a fraction of them
genetic." E. OGG,supra note 122, at 9.
138. New Rationale, supra note 17, at 353-56.
139. PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE
ON MENTAL
RETARDATION,
supra note 2, at 137.
140. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451,
454 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
141. Id.
142. See notes 13-24 and accompanying text supra.
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argument that an attempt to have any person sterilized at the
request of another person should be carefully scrutinized and not
allowed unless the desired operation is completely justified.

The fundamental nature of the right of procreation, the inadequacies of the methods of labeling retardation, the relative lack
of reliable indicators of potential for adequate parenthood, the
noninheritability of most forms of mental retardation, and the
potential conflicts of interest between a parent and a retarded
child compel the conclusion that parents should not have the
unfettered discretion to sterilize their retarded children.
On the other hand, there are certainly some situations in
which the sterilization of a retarded child can be justified. Some
forms of retardation are passed geneti~a1ly.l~~
Some retarded people will never make adequate parents.144Furthermore, sterilization will sometimes be in the best interests of the retarded
~ h i 1 d . As
l ~ ~one federal court noted, "however doubtful . . . the
efficacy of sterilization to improve the quality of the human race,
there is substantial medical opinion that it may be occasionally
desirable and indicated."146In any such situation, the total unavailability of sterilization for retarded children would breed
some of the same evils as does its overavailability-the best
interests and welfare of the child would be frustrated and the
parents' right to secure beneficial medical treatment for their
child unreasonably denied.
Appropriate legislation could be enacted which would resolve
these problems. Statutory procedures could be drafted which
would tend to ensure that a child's fundamental right of procreation is not unjustifiably denied, yet provide a means whereby
desirable and justifiable sterilizations could be performed. Such
a statutory enactment should be upheld as a reasonable exercise
of the police power of a state as a means of protecting the fundamental rights of minors and the mentally retarded and as a vehicle through which a parent can exercise his parental discretion by
utilizing the statutory machinery whenever he feels sterilization
would be in the best interests of his child. It is with this in mind
-

143. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451,
454 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
144. Id. a t 454-55.
145. Id. a t 455; Sexual Sterilization, supra note 23, a t 519-20.
146.. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. a t
454.
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that the following recommendations are made. No attempt has
been made to draft a proposed statute in its entirety. The following suggestions, however, represent what are thought to be the
essentials of a comprehensive statute dealing with this difficult
area. 14'

A. Review Committee
Before any sterilization is performed the person to be sterilized should appear before either a court of competent jurisdiction or a special committee appointed to review such requests.148
The parents (of a minor) and/or legal guardian, if appropriate,
should also appear.
B. Initial Determinations
When the person to be sterilized initially appears before the
committee or court, the following determinations should be
made:
1. Whether the person to be sterilized is competent to give
a knowing, voluntary consent to the 0perati0n.l~~
2. If he is found to be competent, whether he knowingly and
voluntarily consents to the operation.
3. If the person to be sterilized is a minor, whether the
parents knowingly and voluntarily consent to the operation.
C. Voluntary Sterilization
The sterilization of a person may be considered voluntary
and thus subject to no further procedural requirements if:
147. Although this Comment has focused on the sterilization of mentally retarded
minors, the basic principles and safegurards recommended in the text would seem appropriate for sterilization in any context.
148. An example of such a review committee can be found in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368
F. Supp. 1383 (M.D.
Ala. 1974), wherein a federal district court set up procedures to be
followed before any mentally retarded patient of Alabama retardation facilities could be
sterilized. The procedures provided that no sterilization of an institutionalized patient
could be performed without the prior approval of the review committee. The committee
was to consist of five members to be selected by a human rights committee and approved
by the court. The committee was to include a t least one licensed physician, one licensed
attorney, two women, two minority group members, and one resident of the state retardation facility. The categories, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Id. at 1384-85. For other
similar proposals, see Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974); Neuwirth, supra note 70, a t 465.
149. Standards would need to be adopted to assist in making such a determination.
Relevant considerations include the person's age, IQ, education, ability to understand the
nature and consequences of sterilization, ability to communicate, ability to understand
marriage and parenthood, etc. The traditional presumption of the sanity and competence
of adults should also apply in this initial hearing.

I
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1. The person to be sterilized is competent to consent to the
operation and does so knowingly and voluntarily, and
2. Where the person to be sterilized is a minor, his parents
or guardians also consent.150

D . Involuntary Sterilization
The sterilization of a person should be considered involuntary and thus subject to the procedural requirements set forth
below if:
1. The person to be sterilized is not competent to give a
knowing, voluntary consent, or
2. The person to be sterilized is competent to give such a
consent, but does not voluntarily consent thereto, or
3. The parents or legal guardian do not consent to the sterilization of a minor child or ward.151
150. A parental consent provision such as this could be considered suspect in light of
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), which held the parental consent
requirement of an abortion statute unconstitutional. It is believed, however, that the
provision here would pass judicial scrutiny. As explained in Danforth, the primary infirmity of the parental consent requirement invalidated therein was its conferral of an absolute
veto power over the decision of the minor. Id. a t 74. Justice Stewart filed a concurring
opinion, joined by Justice Powell, to clarify his stand on certain portions of the opinion.
These two Justices were necessary for the 5-4 majority in this part of the opinion. Justice
Stewart explained:
With respect to the state law's requirement of parental consent, 4 3(4), I
think it clear that its primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of
an absolute limitation on the minor's right to obtain an abortion. The Court's
opinion today in Bellotti u. Baird, [428 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1976)], suggests that
a materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provision
requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for
prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the
minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to give
an informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event
is in the minor's best interest. Such a provision would not impose parental
approval as an absolute condition upon the minor's right but would assure in
most instances consultation between the parent and child.
428 U.S. a t 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 14351 (1976).
The parental consent provision proposed here does not impose an absolute veto power
over a competent minor's decision to be sterilized. Rather, it provides that unless the
parents are consulted and freely consent to the operation, other procedures are available
whereby the child's desires may be realized if they are found to be in the child's best
interest. This procedure would help ensure consultation with parents over this vitally
important decision to seek sterilization. Such a goal is clearly a constitutionally permissible one. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U S . 52, 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 102-05 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 567 (E.D. Penn. 1975). Consequently, the provision
in the proposed statute would likely withstand constitutional attack in light of the clarification provided by Mr. Justice Stewart in Danforth and the opinion in Bellotti v. Baird,
428 U S . 132 (1976).
151. See note 150 supra.
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E. Requirements for Involuntary Sterilization
The following requirements should be satisfied before any
involuntary sterilization may be performed:ls2
1. The person to be sterilized must be given a full hearing
before the court or committee.
2. Adequate notice of such hearing must be given to the
person to be sterilized and to the parents of such person if he is a
minor, and to the guardian, if any.
3. The person to be sterilized must be represented by counsel at such hearing, either appointed or approved by the court or
committee.
4. The person to be sterilized shall have the right to crossexamination, to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and
to testify for himself.
5. Evidence, including medical and psychological testimony, must be received by the court or committee regarding (a)
the likely impact of the proposed sterilization on the person to be
sterilized, (b) relevant factors indicating the desirability or undesirability of the operation, and (c) the reasons why less drastic
alternative procedures would not be adequate.
6. The court or committee must find that the proposed
operation would be in the best interests of the person to be sterilized or of society.
7. The determination of the court or committee must be
appealable to the state appellate courts.
A statute incorporating these basic elements would adequately protect the important interests of all parties concerned.
A competent adult could obtain a sterilization almost summarily.
A minor would be encouraged to consult his parents and obtain
their consent before undergoing an irreversible sterilization, but
he would be able to obtain the operation without their consent
under appropriate circumstances. The parents of a retarded child
could secure the sterilization of their child upon a showing that
it was justifiable and desirable. A retarded child would be protected, however, against sterilization a t the whim of his parents
or other persons. Such a procedure, by paying due deference to
the important interests involved, would protect one of the most
basic and cherished rights of mankind: the right to bear or beget
children.
Gary A. Dodge
152. These requirements represent the basic due process safeguards necessary in such
a proceeding. See note 20 supra.

